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ABSTRACT 
In many respects, Australian boards more closely approach normative “best 
practice” guidelines for corporate governance than boards in other Western countries.  Do 
Australian firms then demonstrate a board demographic-organisational performance link 
that has not been found in other economies?  We examine the relationships between board 
demographics and corporate performance in 348 of Australia’s largest publicly listed 
companies and describe the attributes of these firms and their boards.  We find that, after 
controlling for firm size, board size is positively correlated with firm value.  We also find a 
positive relationship between the proportion of inside directors and the market-based 
measure of firm performance.  We discuss the implications of these finding and compare 
our findings to prevailing research in the US and the UK.   
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BOARD COMPOSITION AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE:  HOW THE 
AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE INFORMS CONTRASTING THEORIES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE1 
Corporate governance has never been so topical or important.  The Enron failure, 
together with other high profile corporate collapses, has resulted in calls for better 
corporate governance (Lavelle, 2002).  As well as high profile corporate collapses (Clarke, 
Dean and Oliver 1998), there are many debates concerning the efficiency of corporate 
governance.  These include controversy concerning director and CEO remuneration 
(Grossman and Hoskisson, 1998; Nichols and Subramaniam, 2001), increasing compliance 
(Stiles and Taylor, 1993) and performance pressures (Pound, 1995) along with calls for a 
greater “stakeholder” approach to governance (Wheeler and Sillanpaa, 1998).  While much 
corporate governance debate and research activity has focused on the US, there is a 
growing international literature on corporate governance (e.g., Bianco and Casavola, 1999; 
Conyon and Peck, 1998a; Hossain, Prevost and Rao, 2001).  
Our objectives in this paper are to advance the international corporate governance 
research agenda by describing the corporate governance environment for Australia’s 
largest companies and to examine the board composition and firm performance, and any 
relationship between them, in an Australian context.  We begin with an overview of 
research relating to board composition and firm performance and then develop specific 
hypotheses before outlining our methodology and results.  Finally, we discuss the 
implications of our findings for theory and practice. 
Board Structure 
There is an important need for research to inform current corporate governance 
debates.  Yet the study of corporate governance is complicated by the fact that the 
structure, role and impact of boards have been studied from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives, which in turn have resulted in a number of sometimes competing theories 
concerning corporate governance.  Scholars from the disciplines of law (Richards and 
Stearn, 1999), economics (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Tirole, 2001), finance (Fama, 
1980), sociology (Useem, 1984), strategic management (Boyd, 1995) and organisation 
theory (Johnson, 1997) have all made contributions to the corporate governance research 
agenda.  From these disciplines we have numerous governance theories including agency 
theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory and 
stakeholder theory, to name but some of the more dominant theoretical perspectives. 
A common aim of many of the theories of corporate governance has been to posit a 
link between various characteristics of the board and corporate performance.  Agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) has been a dominant approach in the 
economics and finance literatures (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000).  Agency theory is 
concerned with aligning the interests of owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and is based on the premise that there is an inherent 
conflict between the interests of a firm’s owners and its management (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). 
The clear implication for corporate governance from an agency theory perspective 
is that adequate monitoring or control mechanisms need to be established to protect 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented at the Fifth International Conference on Corporate Governance and Direction at 
Henley Management College on 8th – 10th October 2002. 
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shareholders from management’s conflict of interest – the so-called agency costs of 
modern capitalism (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Agency theory leads to normative 
recommendations that boards should have a majority of outside and, ideally, independent 
directors and that the position of chairman and CEO should be held by different persons 
(Bosch, 1995; Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992; 
OECD, 1999; Toronto Stock Exchange Committee, 1994). 
In contrast, stewardship theory claims that managers are essentially trustworthy 
individuals and therefore good stewards of the resources entrusted to them (Donaldson, 
1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 1994).  Proponents of stewardship theory contend that 
superior corporate performance will be linked to a majority of inside directors as they work 
to maximise profit for shareholders.  This is because inside directors understand the 
business they govern better than outside directors and so can make superior decisions 
(Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  Underlying this rationale is the assertion 
that since managers are naturally trustworthy there will be no major agency costs 
(Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  Stewardship theorists also argue that 
senior executives will not disadvantage shareholders for fear of jeopardising their 
reputation (Donaldson and Davis, 1994).  Stewardship theory argues that the board should 
have a significant proportion of inside directors to ensure more effective and efficient 
decision making.  Similarly, CEO duality is seen as a positive force leading to better 
corporate performance, because there is clear leadership for the company (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). 
While isolated studies can be found to support the predictions of both agency 
theory and stewardship theory concerning the relationship between, for example, the 
proportion of outside directors or CEO duality and corporate performance, a recent meta-
analysis based on 159 samples of board composition and 69 samples of board leadership 
structure and their relationships with corporate performance found that there is no 
substantive relationship between board composition and firm performance (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998).  On the other hand, in a similar meta-analysis based on 37 
samples from previous studies, Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000) concluded 
that board composition, or more specifically the proportion of outside directors, had a very 
small positive relationship with firm performance.  Overall there is a general lack of 
consistent evidence of any significant relationship between the composition of boards of 
directors and corporate performance (Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein, 1994; Dalton et al., 
1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996).  
In addition to studies of board composition, sociologists have focused on the study 
of interlocking directorates and their implication for institutional and societal power 
(Pettigrew, 1992).  By utilising network analysis, investigators focus on the social 
networks in which enterprises are embedded and the importance of these networks for 
power within society (Scott, 1991).  Such studies form the basis of resource dependence 
theory, which maintains that the board is an essential link between the firm and the 
external resources that a firm needs to maximise its performance (Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Zald, 1969).   
The key criticism of resource dependence theory is that empirical findings can be 
interpreted according to the paradigm of the researcher.  Pettigrew (1992) noted that the 
empirical findings could be used to offer two different theoretical interpretations 
depending upon whether the study was based on resource dependence theory (e.g., Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978) or class based theory (Zeitlin, 1974).  As with both agency and 
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stewardship theories, by concentrating only on links to the external environment, resource 
dependence theory ignores alternative activities of the board such as providing advice 
(Westphal, 1999; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989), monitoring (Johnson, et al., 1996; 
Bainbridge, 1993; Fama, 1980) and strategising (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Kesner and 
Johnson, 1990).  The research effort follows the familiar pattern in agency and stewardship 
theories – a design aimed at uncovering a single segment of the corporate governance 
mechanism rather than a holistic view of how boards add value. 
Previous Australian Studies 
Australian research into boards of directors is less developed than that in the US 
and the UK.  The Australian literature on corporate governance has been primarily 
descriptive, with an emphasis on describing the size and composition of boards and the 
extent to which board interlocks occur.  Only Stapledon and Lawrence (1996), Lawrence 
and Stapledon (1999) and Muth and Donaldson (1998) have attempted to examine the 
board demographics-firm performance link. 
As Table 1 shows, Australian studies have overwhelmingly concentrated on 
describing the network of inter-corporate relationships.  Of the two previous Australian 
studies that examined aspects of the board demographics-corporate performance link, 
Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) used a similar methodology to Bhagat and Black (1998/ 
2000; 2002) and focused on movements in share price as the measure of corporate 
performance.  This study failed to find consistent evidence that a direct relationship exists 
between board demographics (including the proportion of independent directors) and firm 
performance in publicly listed Australian companies.  Their sample was restricted to the 
top 100 Australian companies (ranked by market capitalisation) but because they used a 
longitudinal measure of share price, their effective sample was only around 70 companies.  
Of interest was their comment that the proportion of independent directors was positively 
related to company assets, net profit and EBIT.  Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) also noted 
that they could not substantiate the finding of Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren 
and Wells (1998) that there is an inverse association between board size and firm value. 
In their study, Muth and Donaldson (1998) investigated the validity of agency 
theory and stewardship theory as well as considering the implications of resource 
dependence theory.  Their final sample size was 145 companies, based on board structure 
data for 1992 and including performance measures for 1992, 1993 and 1994.  The study 
revealed that network connections are a separate dimension from board independence and 
that stewardship theory only holds “where directors are strongly network connected” 
(Muth and Donaldson, 1998: 26).  Their results challenge the assumption under agency 
theory that the monitoring role of the board is valuable and are in direct conflict with 
Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) in reporting that despite a lack of consistent evidence the 
proportion of independent directors had a negative effect on shareholder wealth and sales 
growth.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
Our overall research objective is to review the Australian experience concerning 
board characteristics and corporate performance in light of alternative theories of the board 
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composition-corporate performance relationship.  Australia represents an interesting case 
study as in many respects it more closely resembles world’s best practice concerning board 
composition than other comparable countries.  This is illustrated in Table 2, which shows 
that Australia has a higher proportion of independent directors than either the US or UK.  
In both Australia and the UK, CEO duality is less common than in the US where this form 
of leadership structure is predominant.  In the US, companies also tend to have larger 
boards than companies in either Australia or the UK.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 presents a summary of some of the major reports or guidelines that have 
made recommendations concerning board composition.  While remaining silent on issues 
of board size, these reports do recommend that the roles of chairman and CEO be separated 
and that outside and/or independent directors represent at least a majority on the board.   
Consequently, previous studies of board composition in Australia show that Australian 
boards more closely follow these normative suggestions than do US or UK boards.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
For the purpose of examining this Australian experience, we have three more 
specific research aims.  The first is to describe the board composition of Australia’s major 
publicly listed companies and examine the correlates of board composition.  The second 
aim is to overview the level of interlocking directorships and to explore the correlates of 
these interlocks.  The third and final aim is to examine the links between board 
demographics and corporate performance.  Given these specific research objectives, 
hypotheses are developed in the areas of the impact of board size, proportion of outside 
directors, CEO duality and interlocks with corporate performance. 
Board Size and Organisational Size 
Internationally it is acknowledged that board size and firm size are correlated 
(Dalton et al., 1999; Yermack, 1996).  Such a finding can be explained by at least two of 
the prevailing governance theories.  From an agency perspective, larger companies require 
a greater number of directors to monitor and control a firm’s activities.  From a resource 
dependence perspective, larger companies will require access to a greater range of 
resources and so will appoint more directors to provide access to those resources.  
Consequently, we would expect that: 
Hypothesis 1:  Company size is positively correlated with board size. 
There is also evidence that company size and diversification are related (Bosworth, 
Dawkins, Harris and Kells, 1999) and so, using similar logic, we would expect that:   
Hypothesis 2:  Board size is positively correlated with company 
diversification. 
By definition, a board interlock is dependent upon board members.  Thus, the 
greater the number of board members, the more likely that the number of board interlocks 
will rise, thus we would expect that: 
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Hypothesis 3:  Number of board interlocks is positively correlated with the 
size of the board. 
And, similarly to Hypothesis 1, larger firms would require greater access to 
resources.  We would expect boards of larger firms to employ more interlocks and thus 
predict that: 
Hypothesis 4:  Number of board interlocks is positively correlated with 
company size. 
Size of Board and Firm Performance 
From an agency perspective, it can be argued that a larger board is more likely to 
be vigilant for agency problems simply because a greater number of people will be 
reviewing management actions.  However, agency theorists recognise that there is an upper 
limit to boards.  Jensen (1993) suggests this limit at around eight directors, as any greater 
number will interfere with group dynamics and inhibit board performance.  Alternatively, 
it can be argued that it is not the size of the board, per se, that is critical, but rather the 
number of outside members on the board (Dalton, et al., 1999). 
From a resource dependence theory perspective, it can be similarly argued that a 
larger board brings greater opportunity for more links and hence access to resources.  From 
a stewardship theory perspective, it is the ratio of inside to outside directors that is of 
relevance, since inside directors can bring superior information to the board on decisions. 
Yermack (1996) reports a strong inverse relationship between board size and firm 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q.  Yet Yermack’s mean board size is 12.3 compared 
with the figure of 6.6 that is reported for Australian boards in this study.  It is possible that 
an inverted “U” relationship exists, whereby the addition of directors adds to the skills mix 
and performance of board and firm till it reaches a point where the adverse dynamics of a 
large board outweigh the additional benefits of a greater skills mix, as suggested by Jensen 
(1993). 
Conyon and Peck (1998b) cite some weak evidence from European countries of an 
inverse relationship between board size and market based firm performance.  Chaganti, 
Mahajan and Sharma (1985) report that in a paired sample of non-failed and failed firms, 
non-failed firms had larger boards than failed firms.  Dalton et al. (1999), in a meta-
analysis of board size and firm performance, find a positive systematic relationship, with 
some evidence that the relationship is stronger for smaller firms. 
Given the smaller size of Australian boards and the meta-analysis results, we 
expect that  
Hypothesis 5:  The size of the board is positively correlated with firm 
performance.  
Proportion of Outside Directors and Firm Performance 
As discussed earlier, the impact of agency theory on corporate governance research 
can be observed in the predominance of studies that examine two key questions:  how the 
composition of boards of directors affects firm performance (e.g., Barnhart and Rosenstein, 
1998; Coles, McWilliams and Sen, 2001; Wagner, Stimpert and Fubara, 1998) and how the 
leadership structure of the company (i.e. the duality of the CEO/chairman role) affects firm 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998).  With respect to board composition, agency theory 
suggests that a greater proportion of outside directors will be able to monitor any self-
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interested actions by managers and so will minimise the agency costs (Fama, 1980; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983).  As noted, findings to date have yielded equivocal empirical support.   
On the other hand, proponents of stewardship theory contend that superior 
corporate performance will be linked to a majority of inside directors as they work to 
maximise profit for shareholders (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  Given 
these two contrasting theories and the empirical findings discussed earlier, we will adopt 
the null hypothesis concerning the proportion of outside directors and firm performance. 
Hypothesis 6:  The proportion of outside directors is uncorrelated with firm 
performance. 
CEO Duality and Firm Performance 
Agency theorists argue that the same person should not hold the CEO and chairman 
roles simultaneously, as this will reduce the effectiveness of board monitoring (Finkelstein 
and D’Aveni, 1994).  Stewardship theorists argue, however, that one person in both roles 
may improve firm performance as such a structure removes any internal and external 
ambiguity regarding responsibility for firm processes and outcomes (Donaldson, 1990; 
Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).  As previously discussed, there is evidence in support of 
stewardship theory (e.g., Donaldson and Davis, 1991), along with a body of research that 
finds no impact of leadership structure on firm performance (e.g., Daily and Dalton, 1992; 
1993; Rechner and Dalton, 1989).  Boyd (1995: 309) suggests that neither agency nor 
stewardship theory can predict the consequences of CEO duality and that “duality can have 
a positive effect under certain industry conditions, and a negative effect under other 
conditions”.  Overall, we shall again adopt the null hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7:  Firms with a separate chairman and CEO will be 
uncorrelated with firm performance. 
Interlocks and Firm Performance 
Finally, resource dependence theory maintains that the board is an essential link 
between the firm and the external resources that it needs to maximise performance (Pfeffer, 
1972, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Zald, 1969).  As noted, unlike agency theory and 
stewardship theory, resource dependence theory draws from both the sociology and 
management disciplines (Pettigrew, 1992).  Sociologists have tended to concentrate on the 
links that a board provides to a nation’s business elite (Useem, 1984), access to capital 
(Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Stearns and Mizruchi, 1993) or links to competitors 
(Mizruchi, 1992; 1996).  Using a similar methodology, management scholars, through the 
development of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984), see the board as a potentially important resource for the corporation, especially in 
linking the firm to external resources (e.g., Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000).  In all 
cases, more links would provide greater access to resources and so we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 8:  High levels of board interlocks are positively correlated with 
firm performance. 
METHODOLOGY 
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Sample 
Our objective was to carry out the first large scale investigation of the Australian 
corporate governance environment and so data were collected on the top 500 companies 
(as measured by market capitalisation) trading on the Australian Stock Exchange Limited 
(ASX) in 1996.  Data on both the companies and the directors of those companies came 
from the 11th edition of Huntley’s Shareholder:  The Handbook of Australian Public 
Companies (Huntley, 1997).  These companies represent 97% of the total market 
capitalisation of the companies listed on the ASX (Huntley, 1997).  The actual number of 
companies in our database is 460.  Forty companies were excluded because they had head 
offices outside Australia and the majority of their sales were outside Australia. 
In addition, because the recorded assets of banking institutions consist of loans, 
which represent the use of depositors’ funds, we removed banks from the analysis.  
Similarly, mining companies, which have historically had a major presence on the ASX, 
were also removed from the population, since these companies have a highly speculative 
focus (Arthur, 2001) and effectively represent a separate population of firms.  Therefore, 
we use the data from 348 companies in our study.   
Design and procedures 
The information was entered into a relational database and supplemented by data 
from Huntley’s Financial Database (Huntley, 2000) and the Business Who’s Who of 
Australia (Dun & Bradstreet Marketing, 1997).  By utilising a relational database to record 
this information we could structure the data in a variety of manners (i.e. by company, by 
director, by interlock etc.)  The files were exported into a “flat” SPSS file for further 
analysis.  Since many of our hypotheses predict the direction of the correlation, we 
employed one-tail significance tests to minimise the chance of a type II error. 
Measures 
Company size variables.  We employed three variables to measure company size, 
namely total assets, revenue and market capitalisation.  Since correlations aim to find 
linear relationships, the heavy skew in the distribution reported in the results section for all 
three measures justified the use of the natural log for all three variables for all analyses. 
Diversification.  There are numerous techniques for examining the level of 
diversification of companies (Rumelt, 1982).  In this study we used two measures: (1) The 
number of SIC codes reported by the company; and (2) a measure of relatedness 
(Bosworth, Dawkins, Harris and Kells, 1999) which indicates whether companies are: (a) 
only in one industry (one SIC code); (b) have several businesses, but in same industry to 
the second level of SIC code; (c) have several businesses, but in same industry only at the 
first level of SIC code; and (d) have several businesses, which are in different SIC codes at 
the first level of SIC codes. 
Board composition variables.   In line with US studies (e.g., Bhagat and Black, 
1999; Coles, McWilliams and Sen, 2001; Daily and Dalton, 1993) we employed three 
measures of board demographics.  First, we calculated the size of each board in our data 
set.  Second, when collecting our data we classified each director as either an executive 
(inside) director or a non-executive (outside) director.  This allowed us to calculate the 
percentage of outsiders on each board.  (We acknowledge that this did not allow us to 
calculate the presence of “grey” directors).  As reported in the results, this distribution was 
heavily skewed and so we employed a natural log transformation to investigate correlates.  
Third, we measured CEO duality by classifying chairmen as either an executive chairman 
(one person in the role of CEO and chairman and coded 1) or a non-executive chairman 
(coded 0). 
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Number of interlocks.  The number of interlocking directorships is calculated as the 
number of additional board positions held by directors in the top 460 companies.  We 
include the financial institutions and mining companies (which are excluded from the other 
overall study) because it is necessary to consider a director’s position in the overall 
network rather than simply links to other firms in the study.  For instance, we excluded 
banks from our analysis due to their unique asset structure but, considering that access to 
capital has been seen as a key benefit to a company (e.g., Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988), it is 
necessary to consider interlocks with these excluded firms if we are to accurately test the 
resource dependence theory.  
Corporate performance.  While there are many measures of firm performance such 
as stakeholder satisfaction (Clarkson, 1995), we followed the predominant approach and 
used two financial measures of firm performance, namely Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets 
(ROA).  Financial measures of firm financial performance fit into two key categories, 
accounting based measures and market based measures.  Accounting based measures of 
performance are historical and so experience a more backward and inward looking focus.  
Developed as a reporting mechanism, they represent the impact of many factors including 
the past successes of advice given from the board to the management team and are the 
traditional mainstay of corporate performance measures.  Examples used in the governance 
literature include return on assets (Cochran and Wood, 1984; Hoskisson, Johnson and 
Moesel, 1994), earnings per share (Pearce and Zahra, 1991), and return on equity 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985).  In general, the major concern with accounting measures is 
that they are historical and so lag the actual actions that bring about the results.   
Nevertheless, we have included ROA as a measure of corporate performance as this is a 
common measure used in the literature. 
In contrast, market based measures of firm performance relate to the overall value 
placed on the firm by the market and may not bear any relationship to asset valuations, 
current operations or even the firm’s historical profitability.  These valuations emphasise 
the expected future earnings of the firm and so are considered a forward-looking indicator 
that reflect current plans and strategies.  Measures in this category include market to book 
ratio, Tobin’s Q (Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein, 1994) or constructed indices such as the 
Sharpe measure (Hoskisson et al., 1994). 
Given that there is strong market efficiency in Australia (Ball, Brown, Finn and 
Officer, 1989; Kasa, 1992), it was decided to follow Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and others in using Tobin’s Q.  Under the strong market 
assumption, any positive impacts of board demographics would be readily apparent to 
market participants and so reflected in the market capitalisation of the firm (Fama, 1998). 
The unavailability of many of the variables comprising the theoretical Tobin’s Q 
used in studies by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
prevent similar calculations being used in this study.  Instead we employed Chung and 
Pruitt’s (1994) alternative formula for approximating Tobin’s Q: 
 
 
Finally, as both ROA and Tobin’s Q are subject to short term fluctuations, we 
employed a three year average for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998. 
RESULTS 
assets total of value book
debt term long of value book   stockpreferred of value book   stockcommon of value market Q sTobin' ++=
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The results of this analysis are presented under four subheadings.  First, the overall 
size and diversification of the top 348 companies in our study is briefly described.  Second, 
their board composition is described.  Third, the issue of director interlocks is explored.  
Finally, the links between the variables and firm performance are discussed.  Table 4 
reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables used in the study. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The companies  
The overall defining characteristic of the top 348 companies in the Australian Stock 
Exchange is the very heavy skew in the distribution of measures of company size.  A 
minimal number of companies dominate the population with respect to size of assets, 
revenue and market capitalisation.  This can be seen in   1, which illustrates the cumulative 
percentage of assets, revenue and market capitalisation for the companies in the study.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Another aspect of interest is the extent of diversification of the larger publicly listed 
companies.  The mean number of SIC codes per company was 3.7 with a median of 2 SIC 
codes.  While the majority of companies we studied were diversified at the first level of 
SIC code (56%), only a limited number record over 10 SIC codes (5%) and the largest 
number of codes recorded was 28.  Table 5 provides a full breakdown of the relatedness of 
the companies’ SIC codes. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 shows that there is a strong positive relationship between firm size and 
greater levels of diversification (as measured by the number of SIC Codes).  This result is 
supported by the ANOVA results reported in Table 6, with an inspection of means 
showing that highly diversified companies are larger than one-industry companies.   
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
The boards 
The average size of our sample of Australian publicly listed companies is relatively 
small, containing an average 6.6 directors with a range from 2 to 19.  As highlighted in 
Table 4, there are also strong correlations between the size of the board and company size 
variables of assets, revenue, and market capitalisation (transformed to natural logarithms 
(ln) unless otherwise stated).  Consequently, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  Hypothesis 2 is 
also supported as more diversified companies, as measured by the number of SIC codes, 
have larger boards.  This could however, be associated with more diversified companies 
also being larger. 
Turning to the use of outside directors, the mean proportion of non-executive 
directors is 69%, with a median of 75%.  Only six companies had fully internal boards with 
most of these being the listed property trusts of larger financial corporations.  Thirty-five 
companies had fully external boards.  Larger boards are correlated with a greater 
proportion of outside directors, but this is a weak correlation.  The relationship strengthens 
if the natural log of proportion of outside directors is taken.  Also, the proportion of outside 
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directors is positively correlated with firm size as measured by assets and revenue, but not 
with market capitalisation.  Also using the measure of number of SIC codes, a greater level 
of diversification is not associated with a higher proportion of outside directors.   
With respect to the chairman, there was a notable lack of CEO duality (23%).  
Interestingly, having an independent chairman is related to a larger board size and a higher 
proportion of outside directors and is also associated with larger companies. 
Interlocks 
As with the company size distribution, there is a heavy skew in the number of 
company interlocks.  While interlocks range from 0 to 28, the mean number of interlocks is 
6.4, while the median is four.  Less than 20% of the firms have more than ten interlocks.  
Interlocks are strongly positively correlated with assets, revenue and market capitalisation.  
In addition, a greater number of interlocks are positively correlated with the number of SIC 
codes and board size.  In short, larger boards are associated with larger companies, more 
diverse companies and more heavily interlocked boards. 
Correlations 
At a simple correlation level of analysis, there is a significant relationship between 
some of the four board demographic variables, size of board, proportion of outside 
directors, CEO duality and number of interlocks.  Specifically, larger board size is 
associated with a separate chairman and CEO, a greater proportion of outside directors and 
a greater number of interlocks, as already noted.  A high proportion of outside directors is 
associated with separation of the chairman and CEO role, but not with a greater number of 
interlocks.  Neither are the number of interlocks and CEO duality related. 
As the number of board interlocks is significantly correlated with board size, 
Hypothesis 3 is supported.  Similarly, the number of interlocks is also highly significantly 
correlated with firm size and so Hypothesis 4 is also supported. 
There are three simple correlations between board demographics and Tobin’s Q, 
namely proportion of outside directors, CEO duality and number of interlocks.  This 
suggests that better performance (as measured by Tobin’s Q) is related to inside directors, 
an executive chairman and a greater number of interlocks.  Yet, of interest, none of these 
board demographic variables is significantly related with the average ROA.  This is despite 
their being a strong correlation (.319) between the three-year average Tobin’s Q and the 
three-year average ROA.  
Before reviewing the combined impact of these board demographic variables on 
firm performance, it is instructive to review the correlations between the two performance 
measures themselves, these board demographic measures and the firm size measures, as 
shown in Table 4.  Firm size, as measured by assets and revenue, is inversely related to the 
three year average Tobin’s Q, but market capitalisation is positively correlated with 
Tobin’s Q.  Only assets are negatively correlated with the three-year average ROA.  As 
noted above, there is a .319 significant correlation between the three-year average Tobin’s 
Q and three-year average ROA.  This suggests that companies with significant book values 
or asset bases find it disproportionably more difficult to produce relatively high stock 
prices, compared to smaller companies.  Larger companies, by asset size, also find it 
difficult to produce a strong percentage return (ROA) on those assets. 
Using the two measures of size, assets and revenue in 1996, to predict the three-
year average Tobin’s Q provides a significant result (R2 = 0.109, p = 0.000).  Board size 
(positive relationship), proportion of outside directors (negative relationship) are also 
significant in predicting the three year average Tobin’s Q as show in Table 7. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
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When the accounting-based measure of ROA using the three-year average 
performance is used as the dependent variable, only the two firm size variables of assets 
and revenue are significant.  This relationship is interesting, showing that organisations 
with low asset bases but with strong revenue predict high return on assets.  The result is not 
hugely surprising given that assets comprise the denominator of the measure, but it 
indicates that smaller asset based firms either have a higher profit margin or a higher 
turnover to asset ratio than their larger counterparts.  However, none of the three measures 
of board demographics are significant in predicting these historical measures of firm 
performance.   
Hypothesis 5 at a simple correlation level is not supported.  However, after 
controlling covariance through the regression analysis reported in Table 7, there is a 
significant correlation between board size and the market-based performance measure of 
Tobin’s Q.  Since this is a more robust test of the true relationship, Hypothesis 5 is 
supported in the case of the market-based performance measures. Hypothesis 5 is, 
however, not supported for the accounting-based measure of performance. 
At the simple correlation level Hypothesis 6 (the null hypothesis that the proportion 
of outside directors is not correlated with firm performance) is rejected in the case of the 
market-based measure of performance, but is not rejected for the accounting-based 
measure of performance.  As shown in Table 4, the proportion of outside directors has a 
significant correlation with the market-based measure of performance, but no significant 
correlation with the accounting-based measure.  These results also hold under the stronger 
test controlling for covariates in the regression analysis reported in Table 7. 
Hypothesis 7 conjectured that the presence of CEO duality would not be correlated 
with firm performance.  At the simple correlation level, this hypothesis is not supported for 
the market-based measure only.  However, it is supported when controlling for covariates 
using both market-based and accounting-based measures of performance in the regression 
analysis (i.e. there is no significant correlation). 
Hypothesis 8 (high levels of board interlocks are positively correlated with firm 
performance) is supported at the simple correlation level for the market-based measure, but 
not for the accounting-based measure.  However, the regression analysis, which controls 
for firm size, reveals that it is not in fact related to either measure of firm performance. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this extensive study of the top Australian publicly listed companies 
inform the current debate about corporate governance.  Of general interest, is the negative 
relationship between company size as measured by assets and revenue and the market 
based performance measure of Tobin’s Q.  Over the period of this study larger companies, 
as measured by both their assets and revenue were penalised by the market compared to 
their smaller counterparts.  Given the timing of this study, it may be argued that the interest 
in technology and knowledge-based companies drove this result.  Similarly, using the 
accounting based measure of return on assets, a larger asset base is associated with a 
poorer relative return, a result which can be partly attributed to the simple mathematical 
fact that the larger the denominator, the greater the numerator of profit is required to obtain 
the return.  Interestingly, if one controls for asset size, revenue is strongly positively 
correlated with return on assets.  In short, companies that can achieve greater revenues on a 
lower asset base are more likely to show strong profitability measured in an accounting 
sense.  
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There are some very distinct relationships between company size and board 
composition.  We find that larger companies have larger boards, more interlocked boards, a 
greater proportion of outside directors and are more likely to separate the roles of chairman 
and CEO.  These results can be interpreted in light of two predominant theories of 
corporate governance.  First, they go some way to support the predictions of agency 
theory.  For these larger companies, the greater number of directors is seen as important 
with a higher proportion of outsiders and the separation of the roles of chairman and CEO 
in order to monitor and control the organisation.   
Second, these findings also provide support for resource dependence theory as 
these larger companies see the need for greater links with other organisations.  This then 
translates to these firms appointing more directors and seeking more interlocks.  The 
number of interlocks are related to company size and hence also board size.  However, 
there is no relationship between the number of interlocks and the proportion of outside 
directors or CEO duality.  There is a weak simple positive relationship between interlocks 
and the market-based measure of firm performance, however this could be due to the 
relationship of board size with firm performance.  In short, while the evidence supports the 
notion that boards will seek to link into the external environment, there does not appear to 
be any link between this behaviour and firm performance. 
Turning to correlates of board demographics and firm performance, different 
results occur depending on whether the market based measure of firm performance or the 
accounting-based measure of firm performance is used.  As noted earlier, there are strong 
links between company size and performance for both these measures.  However, with 
respect to market-based performance, the market rewarded larger boards and also boards 
with a relatively lower proportion of outside directors, after allowing for the effects of 
company size.  This seems to support the arguments put forward by stewardship theory.  
On the other hand, no such relationship can be found with respect to the accounting-based 
performance measure.   
These results are consistent with our other findings (Nicholson and Kiel, 2001a; 
2001b), which adopted a case study method to investigate the boardroom.  In the case 
based approach to the relative merits of agency theory, stewardship theory and resource 
dependence theory, we found that no single theory offers a complete explanation of the 
corporate governance-corporate performance relationship, but rather elements of each 
theory can be seen to apply in different circumstances.  These empirical results add further 
weight to our earlier conclusions.  It is not a matter of agency theory or stewardship theory 
or resource dependence theory.  Rather each theory has a contribution to make to the 
governance debate.  There is evidence that boards do need to be alert for agency issues and 
there is a greater likelihood that this will occur when there are outside directors on the 
board.  Nevertheless, the market also rewards the knowledge that inside directors bring to 
the board table.  This is consistent with our case study reviews of board dynamics that also 
illustrate examples of inside directors providing strong support to various board roles.  In 
addition, boards appear to seek to link with the environment, particularly in large, complex 
organisations. 
What then are the implications of our findings for the current debates about 
corporate governance?  First, within practical limits, there are benefits to be had from a 
larger board relative to the size of the company.  Given some US results (Yermack, 1996), 
which suggest an inverse relationship between board size and firm performance, but given 
the much larger average size of US boards, as noted above, it is possible that an inverted 
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“U”-shaped relationship exists between board size and firm performance.  In short, too few 
directors could lead to a suboptimal decision-making body.  On the other hand, too large a 
board also may be negatively related to performance.   
As boards can play a major value-adding role (Kiel and Nicholson, 2002; 2003), 
companies should be seeking to maximise the benefits that can come from the correct skills 
mix on the board.  This can add to what we have termed the intellectual capital theory of 
corporate governance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2001; Nicholson, Kiel and Alexander, 2000), 
whereby it is the skills mix on the board that is a major determinant of the value adding 
that the board brings to the firm.  In this light it is not numbers per se which are important, 
but rather the effective integration of the skills and knowledge base of the board with the 
company’s needs at any particular point in time. 
These results also support the calls of many expert reports on governance towards a 
balance of inside and outside directors on the board.  The results give support to the 
approaches that would seek to have a majority of outside directors on the board, but do not 
support boards solely comprised of outside directors.  These results do confirm some of the 
predictions of stewardship theory in that there is a relationship between market profitability 
and insiders on the board.  Again this is consistent with an intellectual capital theory of 
governance, which sees the appropriate skill mix as being essential. 
Also the results confirm Boyd’s (1995) conclusion, which stated that the issue of 
CEO duality might be contingent on the company’s size and challenges.  In larger 
organisations there is often a very clear reason to have these two roles held separately.  But 
in some highly entrepreneurial situations, the market may view having the position of 
chairman and CEO held by the one person as very positive. 
A further implication of these results is that it appears that board composition might 
be more important from the point of view of the perception of stock markets rather than the 
more historical accounting based measures of performance.  It is interesting that the results 
for board demographics are significant using the market based measure of Tobin’s Q, but 
are not significant with the historical accounting based measure of return on assets. 
With respect to future research, this study still suffers from the limitation that it is 
essentially cross sectional, looking at board composition at a particular point in time.  
Further research is required to see whether such relationships exist over time.  It would 
also be appropriate to examine the extent to which the composition of boards change, and 
how those changes in composition are related to changes in the market environment and 
strategy of the organisation.  In summary, research into corporate governance does have a 
significant contribution to make to the current normative debate about the desirability of 
various corporate governance practices. 
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Table 1 
 
Previous Australian Studies 
Sample 
Study Year of Sample No. of companies No. of directors 
Mean number 
of interlocks 
per firm 
Focus of study Key findings 
Kiel and Tolhurst 
(1981) 1978 
Top 50 publicly 
listed companies - - 
Ownership and 
control 
Found that control of the top 50 companies was in the hands of 
management. 
Hall (1983) 1971-1974 
1,200 publicly listed 
companies 
(excluding mining 
companies) 
2,030 5.6 Interlocks Hall found that there was a significant level of interlocking directorships within the Australian economy. 
Stening and Wai 
(1984) 
1959 and 
1979 
Top 250 publicly 
listed companies 
1,599 
(1959) 
1,622 
(1979) 
2.5 (1959) 
6.3 (1979) Interlocks 
Showed that both average board size and proportion of 
interlocking directorships increased over the study period. 
Carroll, Stening and 
Stening (1990) 1986 
Top 250 publicly 
listed companies 1,640 6.6 Interlocks 
Found that the only 14% of companies in their study had no 
interlocks and that average number was up from Stening and Wai’s 
(1984) figure for 1979 (6.3). 
Alexander, Murray 
and Houghton 
(1994) 
1991 Top 250 publicly listed companies 1,755 4.43 Interlocks 
Reported that the “big linkers” (people who held 4 or more 
directorships) accounted for only 1.8% of the number of directors, 
but 7.2% of the total director positions. 
Stapledon and 
Lawrence (1996); 
Lawrence and 
Stapledon (1999) 
1995 Top 100 publicly listed companies 690 5.74 
Board composition, 
structure and 
corporate 
performance 
Study indicated that the boards of larger firms were likely to be 
larger and have more non-executive directors.  Also found that the 
number of interlocks was positively related to the market 
capitalisation of each firm in the Top 100.  Proportion of 
independent directors positively related to assets, net profit and 
EBIT. 
Muth and 
Donaldson (1998) 1994 
Top 145 publicly 
listed companies - - 
Board structure and 
firm performance 
Network connections are shown to be a separate dimension to 
board independence.  Board independence has a negative effect on 
shareholder wealth and sales growth, but not profit performance.   
Current study 1996 
Top 500 publicly 
listed companies 
(460 companies) 
2,211 6.08 
Board demographics 
and corporate 
performance 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Australian Board Characteristics compared with US and UK Boards 
Australia US UK 
SAMPLE 
Stapledon 
and 
Lawrence, 
1996 
Arthur, 2001 Current study, 2002 
Bhagat and 
Black, 2002 
Barnhart 
and 
Rosenstein, 
1998 
Hanson and 
Song, 2000 
Conyon and 
Peck, 1998a 
Conyon and 
Peck, 1998b 
O’Sullivan, 
2000 
Weir and 
Laing, 2001 
Year 1995 1989 1996 1991 1990 1981-95 1990-95 1991-94 1995 1995-96 
No. of companies 100 135 348 934 321 326 100 2,886 175 320 
Board size  8.89 5.56 6.6 11.45 12.42 12.38  8.56   
Proportion of 
outside directors  0.73 0.62 0.69 0.60 0.60  0.47  0.51 0.47 
CEO duality  0.17  .23   0.82 0.47  0.15 0.17 
 
Table 3 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
COUNTRY GUIDELINE/ REPORT Size of board CEO duality Outside directors 
Independent 
directors 
UK 
Cadbury Report 
(Committee on the 
Financial Aspects 
of Corporate 
Governance, 1992) 
N/A 
The two roles 
should be 
separate 
Minimum of 3 Majority 
US 
NACD Blue 
Ribbon 
Commission 
(2000) 
Board to 
determine 
The two roles 
should be 
separate 
N/A Substantial majority 
Canada 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
Committee Report 
(1994) 
10-16, board to 
determine 
The two roles 
should be 
separate 
N/A Majority must be unrelated 
Australia Bosch Report (Bosch, 1995) 
Nomination 
committee to 
devise criteria 
The two roles 
should be 
separate.  
If combined, an 
independent non-
executive director 
as deputy 
chairman is 
recommended 
Majority One third 
International 
OECD Principles 
of Corporate 
Governance 
(OECD, 1999) 
N/A N/A Sufficient number N/A 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Variable MEAN S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9. 
1 Assets (ln) 12.31 1.54 1.000         
2 Revenue (ln) 11.52 2.24 .807** 1.000        
3 Market  Capitalisation (ln) 12.37 1.36 .869** .653** 1.000       
4 Number of SIC Codes (ln) .93 .81 .380** .527** .373** 1.000      
5 Board Size 6.58 2.31 .607** .584** .597** .458** 1.000     
6 Proportion of Outside Directors (ln)  4.19 .35 .146** .148** .072 .009 .112* 1.000    
7 CEO Duality .23 .42 -.132** -.156** -.100* -.110* -.138** -.510** 1.000   
8 Number of Interlocks 6.38 6.08 .411** .208** .422** .155** .346** .037 -.044 1.000  
9 Tobin’s Q 3 year average (1996-98) (ln) .13 .57 -.297** -.319** .129* -.023 -.059 -.179** .121* .110* 1.000 
10. ROA 3 year average (1996-98) (ln) -2.80 .83 -.191** .008 -.070 -.032 -.066 .023 -.067 -.070 .319** 
  * p < .05 (one-tailed)   
** p < .01 (one-tailed) 
Table 5 
 
Relatedness of a Company’s SIC Codes 
LEVEL OF RELATEDNESS Percentage of companies 
One SIC code 30.2% 
Multiple SIC codes – same at second level 6.9% 
Multiple SIC codes – same at first level 6.3% 
Diversified at first level of SIC Code 56.3% 
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Table 6 
 
ANOVA Results 
 
Dependent variable:  Relatedness 
  Sum of squares df
Mean 
square F Sig.
Assets (ln) Between groups 33.335 3 11.112 4.812 .003
  Within groups 789.775 342 2.309
  Total 823.109 345
Revenue (ln) Between groups 237.476 3 79.159 18.052 .000
  Within groups 1486.490 339 4.385
  Total 1723.966 342
Market 
capitalisation (ln) 
Between groups 27.378 3 9.126 5.118 .002
  Within groups 608.057 341 1.783
  Total 635.436 344
  
 
Table 7: Results of Regression Analysis  
 
Dependent 
variable Predictor variables β Sig. Adj. R
2 Sig. 
Tobin’s Q 3 year 
average (1996-
98) (ln) 
   .144 .000 
 Revenue (ln) -.258 .007   
 Assets (ln) -.225 .022   
 Proportion of outside directors (ln) -.135 .018   
 Board size .243 .001   
      
ROA 3 year 
average (1996-
98) (ln) 
   .105 .000 
 Revenue (ln) .389 .000   
 Assets (ln) -.502 .000   
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Figure 1 
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